Oxford Scholarship Online: Disjunctivism

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Disjunctivism Perception, Action, Knowledge Haddock, Adrian University of Stirling Macpherson, Fiona University of Glasgow Print publication date: 2008 (this edition) Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-923154-6
12 McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0013 Duncan Pritchard Abstract: It is claimed that McDowell's treatment of scepticism offers a potential way of resurrecting the much-derided ‘Moorean’ response to scepticism in a fashion that avoids the problems facing classical internalist and externalist construals of neo-Mooreanism. This chapter evaluates the prospects for a McDowellian neo-Mooreanism and offers further support for the view. Keywords: McDowell, scepticism, Moore, internalism, externalism, neo-Mooreanism,

Contents

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Full Book Contents

Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism

Part I Perception

1 Hinton and the Origins of Disjunctivism

3 Against Disjunctivism

4 Disjunctivism about Visual Experience

5 Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination

6 How to Account for Illusion

7 Disjunctivism and Discriminability

8 The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination

Part II Action

9 Disjunctive Theories of Perception and Action

10 A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons

11 On How to Act—Disjunctively

Part III Knowledgement

12 McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism

13 In Defence of Disjunctivism

14 Perceptual-Recognitional Abilities and Perceptual Knowledge

15 Starting Afresh Disjunctively: Perceptual Engagement with the World

16 The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument

17 Comment on John McDowell's ‘The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument’

Index

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