Oxford Scholarship Online: Perspectival Thought

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Subject: Philosophy Book Title: Perspectival Thought

Perspectival Thought

A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism

Recanati, François , Director of Research, CNRS (Institut Jean-Nicod), and Arché Professorial Fellow, University of St Andrews.

Print publication date: 2007
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-923053-2
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.001.0001

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Table of Contents

Preface

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Introduction

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Book 1. Moderate Relativism

Part 1. The Framework

1. The Distribution of Content

2. Radical vs. Moderate Relativism

3. Two Levels of Content

4. Branch Points for Moderate Relativism

Part 2. The Debate over Temporalism (1) Do We Need Temporal Propositions?

5. Modal vs. Extensional Treatments of Tense

6. What Is at Stake?

7. Modal and Temporal Innocence

8. Temporal Operators and Temporal Propositions in an Extensional Framework

Part 3. The Debate over Temporalism (2) Can We Believe Temporal Propositions?

9. An Epistemic Argument against Temporalism

10. Rebutting Richard's Argument

11. Relativistic Disagreement

Part 4. Relativization and Indexicality

12. Index, Context, and Content

13. The Two-Stage Picture: Lewis vs. Kaplan and Stalnaker

14. Rescuing the Two-Stage Picture

15. Content, Character, and Cognitive Significance

Book II. Experience and Subjectivity

Part 5. Content and Mode

16. Duality and the Fallacy of Misplaced Information

17. The Content of Perceptual Judgements

18. Episodic Memory

Part 6. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification

19. Implicit Self-Reference

20. Weak and Strong Immunity

21. Quasi-Perception and Quasi-Memory

22. Reflexive States

Part 7. Relativization and Reflexivity

23. The (Alleged) Reflexivity of De Se Thoughts

24. Reflexivity: Internal or External?

25. What Is Wrong with Reflexivism

Part 8. The First Person Point of View

26. De Se Thoughts and Subjectivity

27. Memory and the Imagination

28. Imagination and the Self

29. Imagination, Empathy, and the Quasi-De Se

Book III. Egocentricity and Beyond

Part 9. Unarticulated Constituents in the Lekton?

30. The Context-Dependence of the Lekton: How Far Can We Go?

31. Unarticulatedness and the ‘Concerning’ Relation

32. Three (Alleged) Arguments for the Externality Principle

33. Invariance

Part 10. Self-Relative Thoughts

34. The Problem of the Essential Indexical

35. Perry Against Relativized Propositions

36. Context-Relativity

37. Implicit and Explicit De Se Thoughts

Part 11. Shiftability

38. The Generalized Reflexive Constraint

39. Parametric Invariance and m-Shiftability

40. Free Shiftability

41. The Anaphoric Mode: A Bühlerian Perspective

Bibliography

Index

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.001.0001