Oughts and Thoughts
Scepticism and the Normativity of Meaning
Hattiangadi, Anandi St Hilda's College, Oxford
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921902-5







doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.003.0008

Anandi Hattiangadi
Abstract: This concluding chapter synthesizes the arguments presented in the preceding chapters. It is argued that although we may not yet have an adequate theory of representation, we have no reason to believe that none will be forthcoming. The incoherence of the sceptical conclusion gives us some reason to believe that a fully adequate theory of intentionality will be forthcoming.

Keywords: sceptic, semantic realism, meaning, normativity, theory of intentionality, theory of representation,

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