Oughts and Thoughts
Scepticism and the Normativity of Meaning
Hattiangadi, Anandi St Hilda's College, Oxford
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921902-5







doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.003.0005

Anandi Hattiangadi
Abstract: This chapter considers more sophisticated reductionist responses to the sceptical argument — that is those which seek to find the fact that constitutes someone's meaning something by a word among the causal, physical, or functional facts. It considers a wide variety of the most compelling reductive theories that have been presented in response to Kripke's scepticism, and argues that each of these fails.

Keywords: Kripke, reductive theory, sceptical argument, dispositionalist theory, success semantics, teleosemantics, Fodor,

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