Oughts and Thoughts
Scepticism and the Normativity of Meaning
Hattiangadi, Anandi St Hilda's College, Oxford
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921902-5







doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.003.0002

Anandi Hattiangadi
Abstract: This chapter presents the sceptical argument as Kripke formulated it. It argues that the argument is deficient in a number of respects, and suggests how the thesis that meaning is normative — to which Kripke subscribes — can remove the deficiencies.

Keywords: Kripke, sceptical argument, meaning, normative,

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