Images of Empiricism
Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen
Monton, Bradley University of Colorado at Boulder
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921884-4
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218844.003.0008
 

Stathis Psilos
This chapter examines van Fraassen's conception of rationality. It reviews the Bayesian structural conception of rationality and argues that it has been found wanting. It goes on to analyze van Fraassen's voluntarism. Some objections are raised about van Fraassen's reliance on prior opinion, and it is argued that the content of a belief matters to its rationality. Then it criticizes van Fraassen's view that inference to the best explanation is incoherent. Finally, it is shown that van Fraassen's conception of rationality is too thin to capture rational judgement fully.
Keywords: Bas van Fraassen, voluntarist, rationality, inference, rational judgement
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218844.003.0008
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Part I The Scientific Image
Part II The Empirical Stance
Part III Van Fraassen's Reply