This chapter evaluates van Fraassen's rejection of naïve empiricism. For example a naïve empiricist holds that to be an empiricist is to believe some thesis E. Van Fraassen argues that the naïve empiricist faces a dilemma. Suppose the naïve empiricist holds that E is not open to debate: this violates the empiricist idea that disagreement with any admissible factual hypothesis is admissible. Suppose instead that the naïve empiricist holds that E is open to debate: this prevents the empiricist from using E to challenge metaphysical claims. It is argued that that van Fraassen's stance empiricism also faces this same dilemma. The empiricist can consistently maintain that the beliefs necessary to empiricism are subject to empirical confirmation/disconfirmation, while also using those beliefs as the basis of a critique of metaphysics.
Keywords: Bas van Fraassen, naïve empiricism, dilemma of empiricist belief, The Empirical Stance, metaphysics