Bourne, Craig Pembroke College, Cambridge
Print publication date: 2006 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921280-4
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212804.003.0002
 

Craig Bourne
I introduce the Present Problem: how can a theory of time guarantee the infallible knowledge that we have that we are present? I show that only presentism and the tenseless theory can satisfy this requirement, and thus all other theories, such as Tooley's growing block theory and McCall's branching-future theory, should be rejected.
Keywords: presentism, infallible knowledge, tense, tenseless, Tooley, McCall
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212804.003.0002
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Part I The Presentist Manifesto
Part II Presentism and Relativity