Dummett, Michael
Emeritus Professor of Logic at Oxford University, Honorary Fellow of New College Oxford, and Emeritus Fellow of All Souls College Oxford
Print publication date: 2006 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-920727-5
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207275.003.0002
This chapter argues that the decision concerning issues such as the logical category of temporal indicators will cause the semantic theory to be adopted: the theory that explains how statements are determined as true or as false in terms of their composition out of their constituent expressions. It also asks for metaphysics to be accepted — the conception of the constitution of reality. It is argued that in any semantic theory, linguistic items of some particular kind will be treated by the theory as its basic units. These will necessarily be type sentences, whether of a natural language or of such a language regimented by having its sentences put into a standardized form suitable for logical manipulation. Keywords:semantic theory,
truth,
proposition,
sentences,
philosophy of thought