This second essay is concerned with the intentional-historical account of art, focusing on the nature of the artifactuality of artworks presupposed by the account. It develops ideas on the artifactuality of artworks in counterpoint with recent contributions on the subject by Paul Bloom and Amie Thomasson. Against Bloom — who seeks to extend the intentional-historical account to all artifacts — it defends the claim that artworks remain a distinctive sort of artifact in possessing, perhaps alone of all artifact kinds, only intentional-historical necessary conditions. Against Thomasson — who maintains that artifact-making necessarily involves a substantive conception of what is being made — it defends the claim that the conception of artwork necessarily involved in art-making, although not without content, is about as insubstantive as an object concept can be.
Keywords: artifactuality, Paul Bloom, Amie Thomasson, intentional-historical theory