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Levinson, Jerrold
Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park
Print publication date: 2006 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-920617-9 |
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doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206179.003.0025
Abstract: This essay explores the notion of intrinsic value. It is argued thata richly sentient life being a certain wayis the only possible subject of a defensible judgement of intrinsic value. One consequence of this thesis is a disagreement with G. E. Moore regarding the intrinsic value of a beautiful world devoid of sentience, a famous thought experiment from hisPrincipia Ethica. But a more important consequence is the underlining of an intimate connection between the notion of a richly sentient life and the very idea of intrinsic value.
Keywords: theory of value, G. E. Moore, richly sentient life,
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