This concluding chapter reviews the case for a supra-evidential, moral coherentist, fideism: it is argued that adequate criteria have been supplied for distinguishing good from bad faith-ventures. Although neither fideists nor evidentialists can show their opponents to be epistemically irresponsible, fideism might yet be preferred directly on moral grounds. Some moral considerations in favour of fideism are canvassed, including the suggestions that evidentialists lack self-acceptance; that they are too dogmatically attached to naturalisml; and even that they fail to be sufficiently loving! It is further argued that an evidentialist prohibition on those religious faith-ventures that affirm the world to be a moral order, in which the pursuit of the good is not ultimately pointless will sit uncomfortably with a moral epistemology under which basic moral truth-claims can be accepted only through passionally motivated doxastic venture.
Keywords: evidentialism, fideism, love, moral epistemology, naturalism, self-acceptance