The discussion about conformity of wills in the preceding chapters overlooks several challenges raised by the observation of a simple fact: the wills of the persons who surround us are already formed. This means that, to be friends with other people, who will be different things to me, either they must change their will or I must. If we leave out the first option, friendship with other people would (at least sometimes) require me to adapt my will to theirs. Thus, the condition of conformity of wills seems to require one to abandon one's own judgement in order to secure the good of friendship. It also remains unclear what the condition of conformity of wills requires from individuals prior to the actual constitution of their ties of friendship. This chapter shows that the thoughts above, if conceived as challenges to Aquinas's position, arise from a deficient understanding of his censure of people's unwillingness to join wills with others. It traces the motivational background of attitudes that instantiate this kind of unwillingness. The route chosen will take us to the notion of vainglory and — with special emphasis — to superbia, roughly translated as arrogance or unreasonable pride.
Keywords: vainglory, willing, Aquinas, superbia, unreasonable pride