Ameriks, Karl University of Notre Dame
Print publication date: 2006 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-920534-9
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205349.003.0006
 

Karl Ameriks
This chapter builds on the contrast between Hume and Kant by showing how the Critical philosophy can be understood as an ally of Reid's critique of empiricism and the whole tradition of the ‘way of ideas’. The general ‘anti-Cartesian’ and realist approach of Reid's common-sense philosophy has gained many distinguished adherents, but most analytic philosophers have continued to assume that this approach is the very opposite of Kant's. By building on extensive research by Manfred Kuehn on the role of common-sense philosophy in 18th-century Germany, it is argued that there has been a deep misunderstanding concerning passages that have been repeatedly taken to prove that Kant's philosophy completely opposes Reid's. Moreover, it is argued that common sense plays a crucial role in the first stage of Kant's system (in his theoretical and practical philosophy as well as his aesthetics), and that historical research has established that this fact was clearly recognized by a significant circle of early Kantians who worked in Jena right before the full development of German Idealism.
Keywords: Kant, Reid, German Idealism, self, knowledge, Critical philosophy, empiricism, common-sense philosophy
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205349.003.0006
Quick Search Form
 
scroll up fast
scroll up
 
scroll down
scroll down fast
Part I Kant and After
Part II Reinhold and After
Part III Hegel and After
Part IV Contemporary Interpretations