Bennett, Jonathan retired, previously at the Universities of Cambridge and British Columbia, and at Syracuse University, New York
Print publication date: 2001 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-825092-0







doi:10.1093/0198250924.003.0006

Jonathan Bennett
Abstract: Carries an exposition and defence of Locke's view that no individual has, per se, any essential qualities. His views about the essences of kinds—nominal and real—is given. He connected nominal essences with meanings, but Leibniz and Kripke showed that meanings involve real essences as well. Locke's unstable view about how essences relate to universals is also dealt with.

Keywords: essence, Kripke, Leibniz, Locke, meaning, universals,

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