Bennett, Jonathan retired, previously at the Universities of Cambridge and British Columbia, and at Syracuse University, New York
Print publication date: 2001 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-825092-0
doi:10.1093/0198250924.003.0004
 

Jonathan Bennett
Expounds and defends the thesis that Descartes, most of the time, accepted a subjectivist theory of modality according to which a proposition's being necessary is its relating in a certain way to our thought. Several difficult and long-standing problems, and some others that have been neglected, are solved or lessened by this thesis. One is voluntarism—the thesis that God voluntarily gives modal truths their truth-value. It is shown that Descartes is nearly always careful to say not that God cannot lie but that he does not lie.
Keywords: Descartes, God, modality, subjectivism, voluntarism
doi:10.1093/0198250924.003.0004
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