Bennett, Jonathan retired, previously at the Universities of Cambridge and British Columbia, and at Syracuse University, New York
Print publication date: 2001 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-825092-0
doi:10.1093/0198250924.003.0018
 

Jonathan Bennett
Hume shares many philosophical opinions with Spinoza, including the view that there is no sharp radical intellectual difference in kind between humans and other animals. His account of reason's role in demonstrative reasoning is unstable and unclear: it involves a compulsion on the thinker's part, but not a compulsion to believe the conclusion. He offers a sceptical attack on reason—fighting it with its own weapons—purporting to show that none of its deliverances has any probative force whatsoever. In fact, it fails in two ways to secure this sceptical result. Hume, who thinks it does succeed, says that nevertheless nobody will be affected for long by that result; and he takes this as evidence of the robustness of human nature.
Keywords: animal, demonstrative reasoning, human nature, Hume, reason, scepticism, Spinoza
doi:10.1093/0198250924.003.0018
Quick Search Form
 
scroll up fast
scroll up
 
scroll down
scroll down fast