Bennett, Jonathan retired, previously at the Universities of Cambridge and British Columbia, and at Syracuse University, New York
Print publication date: 2001 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-825092-0
doi:10.1093/0198250924.003.0016
 

Jonathan Bennett
Hume's best account of causation says that when we make causal judgements, we express our inclination to conduct a certain inference, and that we are caused to have this inclination by patterns in our past experience. The account becomes untenable, and even absurd, when Hume tries to supply an impression from which an idea of necessity might be copied, and fixes on our feeling (impression) of being compelled to have a certain expectation. Discussion of the view that Hume was a realist about causal necessity, and merely held that we cannot have any knowledge of it is also expressed.
Keywords: causation, Hume, idea, impression, necessity, realism
doi:10.1093/0198250924.003.0016
Quick Search Form
 
scroll up fast
scroll up
 
scroll down
scroll down fast