Tooley, Michael Professor of Philosophy, University of Colorado, Boulder
Print publication date: 2000 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-825074-6







doi:10.1093/0198250746.003.0009

Michael Tooley
Abstract: Contrasts the view defended in the book with alternative accounts, and rejects the latter. It argues that, while ordinary tensed statements involve indexicals, this does not constitute a reason for accepting a static conception of the world. Further, it rejects views according to which there are irreducible tensed properties, and the claim that only the present is real.

Keywords: dynamic conception of the world, indexicals, present, static conception of the world, tensed properties,

You have access to the abstract for this item.     You have access to the full text for this item.



 










Quick Search Form

 
scroll up fast
scroll up
 
scroll down
scroll down fast
Part I Causation, Time, and Ontology
Part II Semantical Issues
Part III Tensed Facts
Part IV Temporal Relations
Part V Objections
Part VI A Summing-Up