Tooley, Michael Professor of Philosophy, University of Colorado, Boulder
Print publication date: 2000 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-825074-6







doi:10.1093/0198250746.003.0006

Michael Tooley
Abstract: Defends both the concepts of truth at a time and of truth simpliciter.It rejects arguments against truth at a time, according to which this concept involves a confusion between propositions and propositional functions. It argues that tensed views of time should employ three valued logics, and that alleged problems with the latter can be overcome by distinguishing between factual truth and logical truth. Finally, the chapter defends the concept of truth simpliciter: Tensed views of time still require this concept so as to apply it to propositions involving atemporal entities.

Keywords: atemporal entities, factual truth, logical truth, propositional functions, propositions, three valued logic, truth at a time, truth simpliciter,

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Part I Causation, Time, and Ontology
Part II Semantical Issues
Part III Tensed Facts
Part IV Temporal Relations
Part V Objections
Part VI A Summing-Up