Hume's Problem
Induction and the Justification of Belief
Howson, Colin Professor of Philosophy, London School of Economics
Print publication date: 2000 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-825037-1







doi:10.1093/0198250371.003.0007

Colin Howson
Abstract: Considers another popular way of evading the force of Hume's argument, Naturalism. According to this doctrine, Hume merely shows why we must give up trying to find top–down justifications for our scientific procedures. Instead, we should use scientific procedures to investigate ways of acquiring knowledge. Naturalism is closely related to Reliabilism, like it claiming that the ordinary canons of evidence are all we need to underwrite the reliability of ordinary inductive procedures. These claims are investigated and shown to rest on a version of the Naturalistic Fallacy.

Keywords: Darwin, naturalism, Naturalistic Fallacy, Quine, realism,

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