Fraassen, Bas C. van Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University
Print publication date: 1989 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-824860-6







doi:10.1093/0198248601.003.0006

Bas C. van Fraassen
Abstract: Induction has given way to Infere nce to the Best Explanation (IBE) in the epistemology hospitable to realism, or to metaphysics in general. Both Dretske and Armstrong provide severe critiques of traditional notions of Induction, and offer new foundations for inductive methods. This chapter and the next argue that neither Induction nor IBE qualifies as a rational strategy for change of opinion.

Keywords: David Armstrong, Fred Dretske, epistemology, induction, inference to the best explanation, rationality,

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Part I Are There Laws of Nature?
Part II Belief as Rational But Lawless
Part III Symmetry as Guide to Theory
Part IV Symmetry and the Illusion of Logical Probability