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Raz, Joseph
Professor of Philosophy of Law and Fellow of Balliol College, University of Oxford
Print publication date: 1988 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-824807-1 |
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doi:10.1093/0198248075.003.0007
Abstract: Begins with a definition of rights and a discussion of the relation between rights and duties. The right to promise, and rights generated by promising are used as examples to show how rights and duties function. Rights are held to be grounded in interests, since their instrumental value derives from the intrinsic value of well-being. Thus only those whose well-being is intrinsically valuable have rights, and rights cannot be regarded as trumps but must be weighed against other valuable ends. The view that rights should be grounded in respect for persons is discussed and rejected.
Keywords: duties, interests, promising, respect, rights, value, well-being,
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