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Raz, Joseph
Professor of Philosophy of Law and Fellow of Balliol College, University of Oxford
Print publication date: 1988 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-824807-1 |
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doi:10.1093/0198248075.003.0006
Abstract: Political neutrality, conceived of as the exclusion of ideals, prevents governments from acting for reasons, which appeal to conceptions of the good, whether valid or invalid. Such a position relies on an elusive distinction between one part of morality, the good, and another, the right. Political welfarism, which allows governments to act specifically to increase want satisfaction, is mistaken in regarding want satisfaction as an intrinsic good. The Nozickean style aversion to coercion cannot be effectively grounded in autonomy, since no agents enjoy complete autonomy, and not only human intervention but also nature can restrict autonomy.
Keywords: autonomy, coercion, ideals, neutrality, Nozick, welfarism,
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