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Plantinga, Alvin
Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame
Print publication date: 1978 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-824414-1 |
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doi:10.1093/0198244142.003.0001
Abstract: I clarify the notion of necessity that I will be examining in the book. In the first section , I claim that the relevant notion of necessity is ‘broad logical necessity’, which I distinguish from causal necessity, unrevisability and a proposition being self-evident or a priori. In the second section, I distinguish between modality de dicto and modality de re. An assertion of modality de dicto predicates a modal property of another dictum or proposition, while a claim of modality de re asserts of an object that it possess a property either essentially or contingently. I conclude by examining the use of the de dicto/de re distinction in the works of Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, G.E. Moore, and Norman Malcolm.
Keywords: a priori, Aquinas, Aristotle, de dicto, de re, essential, Norman Malcolm, modality, G.E. Moore, necessity, property, proposition,
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