Plantinga, Alvin Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame
Print publication date: 1978 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-824414-1







doi:10.1093/0198244142.003.0001

Alvin Plantinga
Abstract: I clarify the notion of necessity that I will be examining in the book. In the first section , I claim that the relevant notion of necessity is ‘broad logical necessity’, which I distinguish from causal necessity, unrevisability and a proposition being self-evident or a priori. In the second section, I distinguish between modality de dicto and modality de re. An assertion of modality de dicto predicates a modal property of another dictum or proposition, while a claim of modality de re asserts of an object that it possess a property either essentially or contingently. I conclude by examining the use of the de dicto/de re distinction in the works of Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, G.E. Moore, and Norman Malcolm.

Keywords: a priori, Aquinas, Aristotle, de dicto, de re, essential, Norman Malcolm, modality, G.E. Moore, necessity, property, proposition,

You have access to the abstract for this item.     You have access to the full text for this item.



 










Quick Search Form

 
scroll up fast
scroll up
 
scroll down
scroll down fast