Fraassen, Bas C. van Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University
Print publication date: 1991 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823980-2
doi:10.1093/0198239807.003.0005
 

Bas C. van Fraassen
No common cause model can fit the phenomena that violate Bell's Inequalities; what sorts of probability models could do so? To answer this, we need to broaden our concept of statistical or probability models, while not broadening it so much as to trivialize it. Introduced here are the distinctions between a surface (phenomenal) model and a theoretical model, and between the general class of geometric probability models and their subclass of quantum theoretical models, together with some elements of quantum logic, and the basic use of probability models to represent measurement situations.
Keywords: Bell's Inequalities, geometric probability, measurement, probability model, quantum logic, surface model, theoretical model
doi:10.1093/0198239807.003.0005
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Part I Determinism and Indeterminism in Classical Perspective
Part II How the Phenomena Demand Quantum Theory
Part III Mathematical Foundations
Part IV Questions of Interpretation