Subject: Philosophy Book Title: Knowledge and the State of Nature
Knowledge and the State of Nature
An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis
Craig, Edward
University Lecturer in Philosophy and Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge
Print publication date: 1999
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823879-9
doi:10.1093/0198238797.001.0001
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823879-9
doi:10.1093/0198238797.001.0001
Abstract:
This book is an inquiry in epistemology directed at understanding the concept of knowledge. Its point of departure is that the standard philosophical project of analysing the concept of knowledge arbitrarily restricts the subject matter and is based on risky theoretical presuppositions. Craig develops an alternative approach, akin to the ‘state of nature’ method in political theory, which builds up the concept from a hypothesis about the social function of knowledge and the needs that it fulfils. Included in Craig's attempt to understand the concept is the endeavour to explain, in the light of his own theory, much that philosophers have written about knowledge, its analysis, the obstacles to its analysis, and scepticism. Moreover, the book aims to show not only why many languages have such constructions as ‘knows whether’ and ‘knows that’ but also why they have equivalents of ‘knows how to’ and ‘know’ followed by a direct object.
Keywords: analysis, conditions for knowledge, epistemology, justification, knowledge, scepticism, state of nature, true belief
Keywords: analysis, conditions for knowledge, epistemology, justification, knowledge, scepticism, state of nature, true belief
Table of Contents
I. Nature and motivation of project. Doubts answered. Plato, Pears, Hobbes, comparison with State-of-Nature Theory in Political Philosophy. Evolutionary epistemology
II. Derivation of first condition; the problem whether belief necessary. Necessary and sufficient conditions an unsuitable format. The prototypical case
III. Need for third condition. Discussion of the Nozick-Dretske analysis
IV. Why causal theory, tracking, reliabilism all good approximations. Why justified true belief a good approximation. Comparison with Grice
V. Distinction between Informant and Source of Information; its nature and point. Application to putative ‘knowledge without belief’ cases; and to comparativism: Goldman
VI. Being right by accident. All analyses insufficient. Blackburn: the Mirv/Pirv principle
VII. Local v. Global Reliabilism. Discussion of McGinn
VIII. Externalist and Internalist analyses. The first-person case. Knowing that one knows
IX. Insufficiency of the various analyses. The ‘No false lemma’ principle. Its rationale—and its effect
X. Objectivisation. The ‘cart before the horse’ objection—and the response
XI. Lotteries and multiple premises: the pull towards certainty. Knowledge and natural laws
XII. Objectivisation and scepticism. Unger's first account
XIII. Two explanations of scepticism: the first-person approach, and the absolute perspective
XIV. Knowledge and involvement. What makes truth valuable?
XV. Testimony and the transmission of knowledge. Welbourne: believing the speaker
XVI. Other locutions: Knowing Fred. Information v. acquaintance. Interacting with Fred. Knowing London—and German
XVII. Other locutions: Knowing how to. The Inquirer and the Apprentice. ‘Knows how to’ compared with ‘can’—and with ‘knows that’
Appendix
Bibliography
Index
doi:10.1093/0198238797.001.0001
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