Knowledge and the State of Nature - An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis
Craig, Edward University Lecturer in Philosophy and Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge
Print publication date: 1999 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823879-9
doi:10.1093/0198238797.003.0003
 

III Need for third condition. Discussion of the Nozick-Dretske analysis
Edward Craig
The author contends that in the state of nature we need some detectable property of informants that correlates well with their being right about p. This yields a twofold criticism of Robert Nozick's truth-tracking analysis of knowledge. First, it is not necessary that the informant be a good tracker in all close possible worlds, merely those that are open possibilities, those the inquirer cannot rule out as being non-actual. Second, the inquirer cannot set herself directly to pick out a good tracker of p, so Nozick's favoured knowledge-conferring property lacks the necessary epistemic accessibility.
Keywords: epistemic accessibility, Nozick, possibility, possible worlds, truth-tracking analysis
doi:10.1093/0198238797.003.0003
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Full Book Contents
I Nature and motivation of project. Doubts answered. Plato, Pears, Hobbes, comparison with State-of-Nature Theory in Political Philosophy. Evolutionary epistemology
II Derivation of first condition; the problem whether belief necessary. Necessary and sufficient conditions an unsuitable format. The prototypical case
III Need for third condition. Discussion of the Nozick-Dretske analysis
IV Why causal theory, tracking, reliabilism all good approximations. Why justified true belief a good approximation. Comparison with Grice
V Distinction between Informant and Source of Information; its nature and point. Application to putative ‘knowledge without belief’ cases; and to comparativism: Goldman
VI Being right by accident. All analyses insufficient. Blackburn: the Mirv/Pirv principle
VII Local v. Global Reliabilism. Discussion of McGinn
VIII Externalist and Internalist analyses. The first-person case. Knowing that one knows
IX Insufficiency of the various analyses. The ‘No false lemma’ principle. Its rationale—and its effect
X Objectivisation. The ‘cart before the horse’ objection—and the response
XI Lotteries and multiple premises: the pull towards certainty. Knowledge and natural laws
XII Objectivisation and scepticism. Unger's first account
XIII Two explanations of scepticism: the first-person approach, and the absolute perspective
XIV Knowledge and involvement. What makes truth valuable?
XV Testimony and the transmission of knowledge. Welbourne: believing the speaker
XVI Other locutions: Knowing Fred. Information v. acquaintance. Interacting with Fred. Knowing London—and German
XVII Other locutions: Knowing how to. The Inquirer and the Apprentice. ‘Knows how to’ compared with ‘can’—and with ‘knows that’
Appendix
Bibliography
Index
 
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