Knowledge and the State of Nature
An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis
Craig, Edward University Lecturer in Philosophy and Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge
Print publication date: 1999 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823879-9




III Need for third condition. Discussion of the Nozick-Dretske analysis
doi:10.1093/0198238797.003.0003

Edward Craig
Abstract: The author contends that in the state of nature we need some detectable property of informants that correlates well with their being right about p. This yields a twofold criticism of Robert Nozick's truth-tracking analysis of knowledge. First, it is not necessary that the informant be a good tracker in all close possible worlds, merely those that are open possibilities, those the inquirer cannot rule out as being non-actual. Second, the inquirer cannot set herself directly to pick out a good tracker of p, so Nozick's favoured knowledge-conferring property lacks the necessary epistemic accessibility.

Keywords: epistemic accessibility, Nozick, possibility, possible worlds, truth-tracking analysis,

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Contents
 
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Full Book Contents
I Nature and motivation of project. Doubts answered. Plato, Pears, Hobbes, comparison with State-of-Nature Theory in Political Philosophy. Evolutionary epistemology
II Derivation of first condition; the problem whether belief necessary. Necessary and sufficient conditions an unsuitable format. The prototypical case
III Need for third condition. Discussion of the Nozick-Dretske analysis
IV Why causal theory, tracking, reliabilism all good approximations. Why justified true belief a good approximation. Comparison with Grice
V Distinction between Informant and Source of Information; its nature and point. Application to putative ‘knowledge without belief’ cases; and to comparativism: Goldman
VI Being right by accident. All analyses insufficient. Blackburn: the Mirv/Pirv principle
VII Local v. Global Reliabilism. Discussion of McGinn
VIII Externalist and Internalist analyses. The first-person case. Knowing that one knows
IX Insufficiency of the various analyses. The ‘No false lemma’ principle. Its rationale—and its effect
X Objectivisation. The ‘cart before the horse’ objection—and the response
XI Lotteries and multiple premises: the pull towards certainty. Knowledge and natural laws
XII Objectivisation and scepticism. Unger's first account
XIII Two explanations of scepticism: the first-person approach, and the absolute perspective
XIV Knowledge and involvement. What makes truth valuable?
XV Testimony and the transmission of knowledge. Welbourne: believing the speaker
XVI Other locutions: Knowing Fred. Information v. acquaintance. Interacting with Fred. Knowing London—and German
XVII Other locutions: Knowing how to. The Inquirer and the Apprentice. ‘Knows how to’ compared with ‘can’—and with ‘knows that’
Appendix
Bibliography
Index
 
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