Knowledge and the State of Nature - An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis
Craig, Edward University Lecturer in Philosophy and Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge
Print publication date: 1999 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823879-9
doi:10.1093/0198238797.003.0001
 

I Nature and motivation of project. Doubts answered. Plato, Pears, Hobbes, comparison with State-of-Nature Theory in Political Philosophy. Evolutionary epistemology
Edward Craig
Raises two problems for the standard approach to the concept of knowledge, which consists in attempting to provide an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. First, it is difficult to make intuitive ‘extensional’ ascriptions of knowledge mesh with ‘intensional’ intuitions about what makes for knowledge. Second, the approach gives no answer as to why the concept of knowledge enjoys such widespread use and to which needs of human life and thought it answers. The suggested alternative approach is the naturalistic one of practical explication, i.e. to start with a reasoned hypothesis about the answer to this last question by considering the state of nature, and then to ask what conditions would govern the application of such a concept.
Keywords: analysis, explication, extension, intension, knowledge, naturalism, state of nature
doi:10.1093/0198238797.003.0001
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice © Oxford University Press, . All rights reserved.
Quick Search Form
Contents
 
scroll up fast
scroll up
 
scroll down
scroll down fast
Full Book Contents
I Nature and motivation of project. Doubts answered. Plato, Pears, Hobbes, comparison with State-of-Nature Theory in Political Philosophy. Evolutionary epistemology
II Derivation of first condition; the problem whether belief necessary. Necessary and sufficient conditions an unsuitable format. The prototypical case
III Need for third condition. Discussion of the Nozick-Dretske analysis
IV Why causal theory, tracking, reliabilism all good approximations. Why justified true belief a good approximation. Comparison with Grice
V Distinction between Informant and Source of Information; its nature and point. Application to putative ‘knowledge without belief’ cases; and to comparativism: Goldman
VI Being right by accident. All analyses insufficient. Blackburn: the Mirv/Pirv principle
VII Local v. Global Reliabilism. Discussion of McGinn
VIII Externalist and Internalist analyses. The first-person case. Knowing that one knows
IX Insufficiency of the various analyses. The ‘No false lemma’ principle. Its rationale—and its effect
X Objectivisation. The ‘cart before the horse’ objection—and the response
XI Lotteries and multiple premises: the pull towards certainty. Knowledge and natural laws
XII Objectivisation and scepticism. Unger's first account
XIII Two explanations of scepticism: the first-person approach, and the absolute perspective
XIV Knowledge and involvement. What makes truth valuable?
XV Testimony and the transmission of knowledge. Welbourne: believing the speaker
XVI Other locutions: Knowing Fred. Information v. acquaintance. Interacting with Fred. Knowing London—and German
XVII Other locutions: Knowing how to. The Inquirer and the Apprentice. ‘Knows how to’ compared with ‘can’—and with ‘knows that’
Appendix
Bibliography
Index
 
Return to top of list
SUBSCRIBER