Abstract: The reference or extension of a term—what that term is about—is determined by the concept it expresses: e.g. x means DOG x is true of dogs. However, the minimalist/deflationary theory of truth (the theory that designates such conditionals as conceptually fundamental) shows that reference-determination will take place regardless of how meaning properties are constituted. It is argued that only from an unreasonable ‘inflationary’ point of view (in which truth, satisfaction, and reference are not defined by such conditionals, but are instead assumed to be susceptible of reductive analysis) can there be a question (the ’problem of error’) about how to reconcile the basic nature of meaning (e.g. the analysis of ’x means DOG’) with its referential import (e.g. its capacity to ensure that x is true of dogs).

Keywords: about, deflationary, extension, minimalism, problem of error, reference, satisfaction, truth,