Harman, Gilbert Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University
Print publication date: 1999 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823802-7







doi:10.1093/0198238029.003.0007

Gilbert Harman
Abstract: A response to a paper by Frank Jackson. Although philosophers sometimes defend certain ‘analyses’ as analytic or a priori truths, such analyses are far from obviously true and are defended inductively. Contrary to Jackson's claim, the rejection of analyticity is based on consideration of central cases.

Keywords: a priori, analyticity, aprioricity, conceptual analysis, Frank Jackson,

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Part I Reasoning
Part II Analyticity
Part III Meaning
Part IV Mind