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Harman, Gilbert
Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University
Print publication date: 1999 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823802-7 |
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doi:10.1093/0198238029.003.0003
Abstract: Intentions are distinct real psychological states, not mere constructs out of beliefs and desires. One intends to do something only if one believes one will do it. Positive intentions are to be distinguished from negative and conditional intentions. All intentions are self-referential and are to be distinguished from beliefs by means of differences between theoretical reasoning, which directly modifies beliefs, and practical reasoning, which directly modifies intentions. One can sometimes adopt intrinsic desires at will and one may pursue a plan in order to give significance to earlier acts.
Keywords: beliefs, desires, intentions, plans, practical reasoning, reasoning, self-reference,
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