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Davidson, Donald
(1917-2003) formerly Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley
Print publication date: 2005 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2005 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823757-0 doi:10.1093/019823757X.003.0008 |
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This essay clarifies the Davidson’s claim that “There is no such thing as language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed”. It agrees with Dummett that a theory of meaning requires the Wittgensteinian distinction between using words correctly and merely thinking one is, between following a rule and believing one is following a rule; and that a grasp of this distinction requires social interaction. Communication is successful if the speaker is taken to mean what he wants to be taken to mean. What is needed is not a set of shared rules but that speaker and listener be able to correlate the speaker’s responses with the occurrence of a shared stimulus in their common world.
Keywords: language, Michael Dummett, meaning, communication,
doi:10.1093/019823757X.003.0008
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