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Davidson, Donald
(1917-2003) formerly Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley
Print publication date: 2005 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2005 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823757-0 doi:10.1093/019823757X.003.0005 |
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This essay explores the shift in Quine’s thinking about the relation between meaning and truth. Quine has long been a deflationist about truth. A deflationist is one who holds that to say of a sentence in one’s own language that it is true, is to say no more than one says by uttering that sentence. In Pursuit of Truth (1990), Quine takes shared external circumstances as the key to the correct interpretation of observation sentences rather than shared patterns of stimulation; this shift has saved the natural relation between meaning and truth.
Keywords: concept of truth, meaning, Quine, Tarski,
doi:10.1093/019823757X.003.0005
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