Davidson, Donald (1917-2003) formerly Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley
Print publication date: 2005 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823757-0
doi:10.1093/019823757X.003.0001
 

Donald Davidson
This essay examines the scepticism about the concept of truth in the past century. It argues that although correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, and epistemic theories of truth are all failures, this does not mean that the concept of truth can be dismissed as a useless concept. In fact, the concept of truth plays a key role in understanding the world and the minds of agents.
Keywords: concept of truth, philosophy, correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, epistemic, deflationism
doi:10.1093/019823757X.003.0001
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TRUTH
LANGUAGE
ANOMALOUS MONISM
HISTORICAL THOUGHTS