Helm, Paul Professor of the History and Philosophy of Religion, King's College, London
Print publication date: 1997 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823725-9
doi:10.1093/0198237251.003.0009
 

Paul Helm
If human indeterministic choice is denied, and divine foreknowledge is compatible only with determinism, is human responsibility thereby compromised? This chapter argues ad hominem that if determinism is compatible with human responsibility in an atheistic universe then it is compatible with such responsibility in a deterministic theistic universe. Several arguments to the contrary are rebutted.
Keywords: choice, determinism, indeterminism, responsibility, universe
doi:10.1093/0198237251.003.0009
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