Helm, Paul Professor of the History and Philosophy of Religion, King's College, London
Print publication date: 1997 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823725-9
doi:10.1093/0198237251.003.0007
 

Paul Helm
This is a continuation of the discussion of the previous chapter. It explores the consequences for omniscience if God is in time and discusses various reformulations of omniscience made to accommodate human indeterministic freedom. The metaphysical status of the future is discussed, in particular whether there is a future to be known, and arguments are formulated against those who deny that there is. Further, it is argued that the claims that the future does not already exist, and that the future is determinate, are distinct claims.
Keywords: determinism, exist, freedom, free will, future, God, omniscience
doi:10.1093/0198237251.003.0007
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