Swinburne, Richard Nolloth Professor of Philosophy of the Christian Religion, University of Oxford
Print publication date: 1997 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823698-6







doi:10.1093/0198236980.003.0010

Richard Swinburne
Abstract: We have no grounds for supposing that a foetus has a soul until it is conscious, and no grounds for supposing that it is conscious until there occur in it brain processes similar to those that accompany consciousness in more developed human brains. The higher animals have souls. While scientists may discover vast numbers of correlations between mental events and brain events, it is most improbable that they will be able to explain why there are the correlations that they are, or any correlations at all – that is, why neural systems of a certain complexity give rise to souls. The very success of science in achieving vast integrations of theories in physics and chemistry was achieved by separating off from the physical world colours, tastes etc; but this cannot be done when we are looking for a theory with psychophysical laws.

Keywords: animals, Aquinas, brain processes, complexity, consciousness, Darwin, Davidson, foetus, psychophysical laws, soul,

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Part I The Mental Life
Part II The Soul
Part III The Human Soul