Concepts - Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
Fodor, Jerry A. Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Jersey
Print publication date: 1998 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823636-8
doi:10.1093/0198236360.003.0007
 

7 Innateness and Ontology, Part II: Natural Kind Concepts
Jerry A. Fodor
Natural kind properties are not mind dependent. So why are concepts such as WATER, GIRAFFE, etc. acquired from their instances? Critical discussion of the view that concepts of natural kinds are the models on which psychological theories of concepts should be constructed.
Keywords: concepts, innateness, natural kinds
doi:10.1093/0198236360.003.0007
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice © Oxford University Press, . All rights reserved.
Quick Search Form
Contents
 
scroll up fast
scroll up
 
scroll down
scroll down fast
Full Book Contents
Preface
1 Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory
2 Unphilosophical Introduction: What Concepts Have to Be
3 The Demise of Definitions, Part I: The Linguist's Tale
4 The Demise of Definitions, Part II: The Philosopher's Tale
5 Prototypes and Compositionality
6 Innateness and Ontology, Part I: The Standard Argument
7 Innateness and Ontology, Part II: Natural Kind Concepts
Bibliography
Index
 
Return to top of list
SUBSCRIBER