Aristotle's second objection to the Arguments from the Sciences is that, if it proved the existence of forms, then it would commit one to admitting forms of artefacts; and this is a conclusion undesired by Platonism. Fine raises a difficulty, in that Plato in fact often appears to countenance forms of artefacts; in this chapter, she considers Aristotle's objection and Plato's understanding of the forms of artefacts. Fine argues that, although Plato does countenance forms of artefacts, such forms do not have the features that are associated (by Aristotle, at least) with Platonic forms, strictly speaking. Indeed, Plato himself denies that artefact forms are perfect, separate, or non-sensible. Regarding the objection, then, Fine concludes that it is reasonable, because Aristotle is justified in claiming that the Arguments from the Sciences lead to the existence of artefact forms, and it is a result that Plato may not welcome.
Keywords: Arguments from the Sciences, Aristotle's second objection, forms of artefacts, perfect, Platonic forms, separate