Swinburne, Richard Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion, University of Oxford
Print publication date: 1996 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823544-6
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235446.003.0003
 

Richard Swinburne
There are two different explanations of events — inanimate or scientific (in terms of the powers and liabilities of objects), and personal (in terms of the powers, beliefs, and purposes of persons). The ‘laws of nature’ are just statements about the powers and liabilities of objects of some kind. An explanatory hypothesis is probable insofar as it leads us to expect many otherwise inexplicable events to be explained, is simple, and fits in with ‘background knowledge’ (knowledge of how things work in fields outside the scope of the hypothesis).
Keywords: explanation, hypothesis, laws of nature, probability, simplicity
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235446.003.0003
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