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Swinburne, Richard
Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion, University of Oxford
Print publication date: 1994 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-823512-5 |
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doi:10.1093/0198235127.003.0004
Abstract: Causation is a basic category, not reducible to anything else. Intentional causation is a species of causation of which we are aware when we try to move our limbs. Talk of ‘laws of nature’ is reducible to talk of the causal powers and liabilities of substances. A perfectly free (and so rational) agent will inevitably do only (what he believes to be) good actions – the best action or one of a number of equal best actions, if there are such.
Keywords: agency, causal power, causation, free will, intentional causation, intentionality, laws of nature, perfect freedom, rational agency, substance,
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