Schmaltz, Tad M. Professor of Philosophy, Duke University
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-532794-6







doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327946.003.0005

Tad M. schmaltz
Abstract: This chapter considers the issue of causal interaction in the context of Descartes's dualistic psychology. A common objection is that there is a “scandal of Cartesian interaction” that derives from the fact that Descartes cannot explain the interaction of objects that differ in nature. However, it is argued that Descartes confronts not this scandalous problem but rather different sets of difficulties that apply to the cases of body-to-mind and mind-to-body action and that, in contrast to the scandalous problem, are linked to earlier scholastic discussions. Moreover, it is concluded that Descartes's conservationist physics creates difficulties for his view of mind-to-body action that he never fully confronted.

Keywords: Descartes, causation, Cartesian interaction, body-to-mind action, mind-to-body action, scholasticism,

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Descartes on Causation