Unger's sorites-style argument against ordinary objects relies on the vagueness of the associated terms. While standard solutions to the problems of vagueness are often accused of being ad hoc, this chapter argues that the above view of reference provides an understanding of the source of vagueness that suggests that supervaluational solutions and Tye's indeterminist solution are entirely suitable and not ad hoc. Others reject ordinary objects given worries that these objects would have to be vague, since ontic vagueness is often considered incoherent. This chapter also addresses Horgan's and Evans' reasons for rejecting ontic vagueness, arguing that the kind of vagueness in the world that we must posit to accept ordinary objects is a kind of anodyne vagueness that explains the vagueness in the world in terms of vagueness in our representations, but that even serious ontological vagueness does not present the difficulties it is thought to.
Keywords: sorites, supervaluation, indeterminism, Horgan, Evans, Tye, Unger, ontic vagueness