Beyond Reduction
Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science
Horst, Steven Department of Philosophy, Wesleyan University
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-531711-4
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.003.0011
 

Steven Horst
This final chapter returns to the topic of naturalism, exploring the implications of Cognitive Pluralism for naturalism. The answer depends on the type of “naturalism” that is in question. In philosophy of science, naturalism indicates the view that philosophy of science should not proceed through a priori reasoning, but be guided by what is found in the sciences themselves. In this respect, this book has pursued a “naturalistic” approach. However, if naturalism means that the mind can be wholly accommodated in the world of nature as understood by the natural sciences, the conclusions to be drawn are antinaturalistic. Pluralism is antireductionistic. And cognitivism treats the mind as being in a special sense prior to our models of the world, including our scientific models.
Keywords: Naturalism, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, Cognitive Pluralism, metaphysics, ontology
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.003.0011
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Beyond Reduction
Part I Naturalism and Reduction in Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Science
Part II Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science
Part III Cognitive Pluralism, Explanation, and Metaphysics