Abstract: This chapter argues that Audi's attempt to ground Ross's prima facie duties in Kant's categorical imperative does not succeed. Audi has attempted to give a Kantian basis for Rossian pluralism that can explain the comparative strength of duties, offer an epistemic guide for such comparisons, unify the duties, and provide the duties a deeper rationale. This chapter objects that Audi's Kantian explanations tend to assume what should be explained and that Kantian notions such as dignity might not have enough independent content to help matters. Moreover, any Kantian attempt to explain limits on the duty of beneficence faces problems stemming from the fact that the value Kant locates in persons is agent-neutral and independent of states of affairs. This chapter closes by suggesting that a Thomist account can do some of the unifying work Audi wants, but without partaking of the “grandiose” ambition of Kant's project.

Keywords: ethics, Kant, Ross, prima facie duty, pluralism, Thomism,