Timmons, Mark
Philosophy Department, Arizona State University
Greco, John
Philosophy Department, Fordham University
Mele, Alfred
Philosophy Department, Florida State University
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-531195-2
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0016
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-531195-2
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0016
16
Justifying Grounds, Justified Beliefs, and Rational Acceptance
Audi defends his views in epistemology against the challenges raised by Laurence BonJour (Chapter 8), Timothy Williamson (Chapter 10), and William Alston (Chapter 11) in Part II, “Knowledge, Justification, and Acceptance.” Specifically, Audi addresses his concerns about the sorts of beliefs that can be noninferentially justified, the sense in which the grounds of justification may be internal, and the range of attitudes that admit of justification and rationality.
Keywords: epistemology, justification, rationality
Keywords: epistemology, justification, rationality
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0016
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