The Innate Mind: Volume 2: Culture and Cognition
Carruthers, Peter Professor of Philosophy, University of Maryland
Laurence, Stephen Philosophy, University of Sheffield
Stich, Stephen Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Rutgers University
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-531013-9
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310139.003.0005
 

5 Human Groups as Adaptive Units
Toward a Permanent Consensus
David Sloan Wilson
Foundational changes are taking place in the understanding of human groups. For decades, the biological and social sciences have been dominated by a form of individualism that renders groups as nothing more than collections of self-interested individuals. Now groups themselves are being interpreted as adaptive units, organisms in the own right, in which individuals play supportive roles. This chapter attempts to establish a permanent consensus for human groups as adaptive units, based on multilevel selection theory.
Keywords: culture, admiration, conformism, multilevel selection theory, individualism
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310139.003.0005
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Full Book Contents
Preface
1 Introduction
Part I Learning, Culture, and Evolution
2 Culture, Adaptation, and Innateness
3 About 17 (+/U+22122) Potential Principles about Links between the Innate Mind and Culture
4 Steps toward an Evolutionary Psychology of a Culture-Dependent Species I thank Steve Stich, Peter Carruthers, and Steve Laurence for both encouraging me to write this chapter and providing valuable feedback, Rob Boyd for our many stimulating discussions, and Marjorie Harness Goodwin for helpful suggestions.
5 Human Groups as Adaptive Units
6 The Baldwin Effect and Genetic Assimilation
7 The Baldwin Effect and Genetic Assimilation A precursor of this essay was read at the Workshop on Philosophy of Biology of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bristol October 8–9, 2004. I thank the participants for their comments. I am also grateful to Pat Bateson for discussing some of these issues with me.
8 Mental Number Lines I thank Brian Butterworth, Susan Carey, Peter Carruthers, Robyn Carston, Stephen Laurence, Richard Samuels, Gabriel Segal, and Elizabeth Spelke for helpful comments.
Part II Modularity and Cognitive Architecture
9 Modularity in Language and Theory of Mind
10 Culture and Modularity This chapter integrates and expands elements from Sperber (2003) and Sperber & Hirschfeld (2004).
11 Shaping Social Environments with Simple Recognition Heuristics
12 Simple Heuristics Meet Massive Modularity I am grateful to Stephen Stich for a conversation that prompted the main set of thoughts in this chapter; and to Richard Samuels for an earlier exchange that also proved fruitful. Thanks to Mike Anderson, Clark Barrett, Stephen Laurence, Rui Mata, Stephen Stich, and Peter Todd for comments on an earlier draft.
13 Modularity and Design Reincarnation Thanks to Peter Carruthers, Brad Duchaine, and Greg Bryant for helpful comments on this chapter.
14 Cognitive Load and Human Decision, or, Three Ways of Rolling the Rock Uphill I thank Peter Carruthers, Matteo Mameli, and the audiences at the AHRC Culture and the Innate Mind conference, July 2003 at the University of Sheffield, and at the Victoria University of Wellington for helpful feedback on this essay.
Part III Morality, Norms, and Religion
15 How Good Is the Linguistic Analogy? I am very grateful to Paul Pietroski, Stephen Laurence, and Peter Carruthers.
16 Is Human Morality Innate? Much of this chapter is based on material in my book The Evolution of Morality (MIT Press, 2006).
17 A Framework for the Psychology of Norms
18 Religion's Innate Origins and Evolutionary Background
Bibliography
Index
 
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