Ethics Vindicated
Kant's Transcendental Legitimation of Moral Discourse
Bencivenga, Ermanno Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine
Print publication date: 2006 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-530735-1







doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195307351.003.0004

Ermanno Bencivenga
Abstract: That an act is unqualifiedly good means that it is rational: moral values are reason's commentary on facts. The only free acts are the good, rational ones; when one behaves irrationally, one is no longer acting at all. Which does not mean that one should not regard oneself as responsible for one's evil behavior. On the contrary, doing so is an additional act, conducive to the reestablishment of the rational level of interaction that was interrupted by the evil behavior.

Keywords: good, evil, rationality, responsibility,

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