|
Gert, Bernard
Stone Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, Dartmouth College
Print publication date: 2005 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2005 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-517689-6 doi:10.1093/0195176898.003.0006 |
|
|
This chapter provides a definition of impartiality, and shows that the most commonly accepted account confuses impartiality with consistency. It provides an account of the kind of impartiality required by morality by discussing the respect in which morality requires impartiality and the group with regard to which morality requires impartiality in this respect. It shows that rational persons can disagree about the scope of moral impartiality, that is, about the group with regard to which morality requires impartiality.
Keywords: consistency, respect, moral impartiality,
doi:10.1093/0195176898.003.0006
|
|